Reeling In Gang Prosecution: Seeking a Balance in Gang Prosecution by Caldwell, H. Mitchell
REELING IN GANG PROSECUTION - FINAL  (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2015 12:42 PM 
 
 
REELING IN GANG PROSECUTION:  
SEEKING A BALANCE IN GANG PROSECUTION 
H. MITCHELL CALDWELL*
 
 
Gang violence is a severe problem across the United States. Spreading from their inner-city 
origins to surrounding suburbs, violent street gangs have proven all but impervious to legislative 
attempts to curb their growing influence. This Article examines the presence of gangs, as well as 
one of the landmark efforts to combat them, the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention 
(“STEP”) Act. The Article explores the potential abuse of anti-gang legislation by prosecutors, 
such as overfiling and coercive plea-bargaining. Lastly, the Article offers solutions to curb such 
abuse, including a statewide prosecutorial review board, full discovery from time of initial filing, 
and a restriction on joining gang-related charges to other charges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On a sunny afternoon in Los Angeles, a backyard barbeque at the Salinas residence was 
disrupted when several members of the rival Hernandez street gang entered the backyard and 
initiated a fight. During the fight, Ramon Hernandez, an active member of the Hernandez street 
gang, suffered a serious, nonfatal stab wound. The remaining Hernandez gang members fled prior 
to the police arrival. Ezequiel Salinas, a younger Salinas brother with no known gang 
involvement, was arrested along with his older brother Jesse, a known active member of the 
Salinas street gang. Both Ezequiel and Jesse Salinas were charged with assault with a deadly 
weapon
1
 and a gang enhancement.
2
 
Despite no direct proof that Ezequiel was a member of the Salinas gang or that Ezequiel 
inflicted the knife wound, the prosecutor was confident that his “gang expert” would be able to 
link Ezequiel to the gang. Moreover, the expert would be allowed to testify that the Salinas gang 
engaged in a “pattern of criminal gang activity” due to the gang enhancement charge.
3
 The 
expert’s testimony could span a decade, detail violent events, and involve people Ezequiel had 
never heard of or known. The prosecutor, well aware that such evidence most likely would link 
Ezequiel by association to the Salinas gang and overwhelm the jurors’ ability to focus on the 
nuances of the fight that led to the stabbing, could file the charges with impunity even though the 
incriminating evidence was weak at best. Legitimate questions concerning Ezequiel’s non-
involvement could easily be lost. Was Ezequiel merely present at the scene of the crime? Was he 
an aider and abettor? A co-conspirator? Or was he acting solely in self-defense? These types of 
nuanced questions can easily be ignored when overwhelmingly negative and frightening evidence 
is presented. 
Beyond the consequences of the gang sentence enhancement if the case were to proceed 
to trial, there is the potential for coercive plea-bargaining before trial.
4
 The potential punishment 
for assault could go from a two-year prison term to an additional two-, three-, four-, five-, or ten-
year prison term following a sentence enhancement charge.
5
 One can easily imagine the 
conundrum inside Ezequiel’s mind. Should he defend his innocence by going to trial and risk 
being sentenced up to twelve years in prison? Or should he take a plea deal and eat two years? 
In considering this scenario, several thoughts most likely come to mind. First, we may 
consider that Ezequiel is at the blunt end of a very raw deal. Yet, we recognize the incalculable 
                                                                
1  CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (West 2015). 
2  Id. § 186.22(b).  
3  Id. § 186.22(e); see, e.g., Erin R. Yoshino, Note, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons 
From Interviews with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 135-36 (2008) (“[T]he gang expert will often 
choose the most heinous and violent crimes to illustrate the gang’s pattern of criminal activity.”).  
4  See Brian Gregory, Comment, Brady Is the Problem: Wrongful Convictions and the Case for “Open File” 
Criminal Discovery, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 819, 827 (2012) (“Taken together, Bagley, Bordenkircher, and Ruiz have created a 
reality in which prosecutors are free to make threats of long prison sentences or even death to induce a guilty plea . . . . 
These circumstances may lead even wholly innocent defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid the risk of conviction at 
trial.”).  
5  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2015). 
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cost in human misery and economic waste that the horrific legacy of gangs has caused.
6
 Violent 
gangs are a clear, present, and continuing danger, and significant measures are necessary to 
counter them. This battle being waged on urban streets occurs in criminal courtrooms as 
prosecutors attempt to deter criminal gang conduct.
7
 Effectively prosecuting gang violence is an 
admirable goal, but there are concerns that the efforts of some prosecutors come at the expense of 
violating their higher calling and sworn ethical responsibilities.
8
 Are the tools crafted by 
legislatures across the country being employed improperly? Are prosecutors abusing gang-related 
charges and enhancements in order to coerce pleas, a practice resulting in harsh sentences that are 
unwarranted? 
This Article examines legislative and prosecutorial efforts utilizing anti-gang legislation. 
First, Part I explores the extent of the gang-related crime problems as well as the origins and 
evolution of anti-gang legislation. Part II analyzes the successes and failures of anti-gang 
legislation, focusing on the inherent constitutional challenges. Part III examines prosecutors’ 
ethical boundaries, and Part IV tackles the potential for prosecutorial abuse of anti-gang 
legislation. Finally, Part V offers proposals designed to offset some of the abuses that have arisen 
in gang prosecution. 
I. GANGS AND ANTI-GANG LEGISLATION 
Gangs, such as the Bloods, the Crips, Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13), and 
18th Street now have a nation-wide presence.
9
 Not surprisingly, their presence has translated into 
                                                                
6  See David S. Rutkowski, Student Article, A Coercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging the 
Moral Gap in Existing Law, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 137, 139 (1996) (“Gangs and gang crime pose an 
extraordinary threat to society at large; in gang-controlled communities, they can exert almost ubiquitous authority.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Remarks of 
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Los Angeles Gangs Press Conference (Mar. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060331.html (“Mayors and U.S. Attorneys . . . know better 
than anyone that gangs have become an increasingly deadly threat to the safety and security of our Nation’s citizens.”). 
7  Jeffrey T. Wennar, Ganging up on Gangs: The Steps Necessary for Effectively Prosecuting Gang 
Violence, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2010, at 3, 3 (“[Gangs] . . . . bring a culture of violence and drugs to our doorsteps, 
creating an atmosphere of fear, diminishing the quality of life, and endangering the safety, well-being, and future of our 
children.” (first alteration in original) (quoting MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON THE GROWTH OF VIOLENT STREET GANGS IN SUBURBAN AREAS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs27/27612/27612p.pdf)); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and Race, 
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 109 (2000) (“Violent gangs are now having a major impact on the quality of life of 
communities throughout the nation.” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
A COORDINATED APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGE OF GANG VIOLENCE: A PROGRESS REPORT 1 (1996))).  
8  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2008) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991) (claiming that in criminal 
cases the “[c]odes of professional responsibility” treat prosecutors as “‘ministers’ having an ethical duty to ‘do justice.’” 
(quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983))). 
9  Combating Youth Violence: What Federal, State and Local Governments Are Doing to Deter Youth 
Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t 
Reform, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) [hereinafter Combating Youth Violence] (statement of Robert B. Loosle, Special Agent in 
Charge, L.A. Criminal Div., FBI), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg45334/pdf/CHRG-
109hhrg45334.pdf.  
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this country’s most significant crime problem.
10
 Often heavily armed and with strong ties to the 
illegal drug trade, gangs are “portrayed as an alien presence in otherwise stable communities.”
11
 
Gangs have been a part of American cityscape since the early nineteenth century.
12
 Like 
modern gangs, the earlier incarnations had a reputation for being territorial and engaging in 
criminal activity.
13
 Fueled by the influx of immigrants from Italy, Ireland, China, and other 
countries, these early gangs provided opportunities and their own sense of belonging to a group of 
people whom society largely ignored.
14
 Gangs quickly spread, nearly unchecked by authorities, 
who were convinced that gangs were only a threat in “certain types of neighborhoods.”
15
 
Predictably, these neighborhoods were low-income, with substantial immigrant and minority 
populations.
16
 
Pop culture has established gangs as a part of inner city life.
17
 Gang movies, such as The 
Wild Ones and Rebel Without a Cause glorified gang activities, as did the well-known 1957 
Broadway musical, Westside Story.
18
 The musical, a revamp of the classic Romeo and Juliet story, 
replaced the feuding Montague and Capulet families with the Jets and Sharks.
19
 Despite the 
show’s violent and tragic ending, one researcher characterized the show as creating the “image of 
a group of kids whose members were aggressive and rebellious—but appealing.”
20
 
Despite a momentary decline in gang activity in the late 1960s,
21
 when authorities finally 
                                                                
10  NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., 2011 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT: EMERGING TRENDS 9 
(2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011-national-
gang-threat-assessment-emerging-trends (“Gangs are responsible for an average of 48 percent of violent crime in most 
jurisdictions and up to 90 percent in several others . . . .”); id. at 11 (“Neighborhood-based gangs continue to pose the 
greatest threat in most jurisdictions nationwide.”).  
11  Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 31 (1998) 
(quoting Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization of Youth Gangs, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 943, 945 (1993)). 
12  David R. Truman, Note, The Jets and Sharks Are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal Street 
Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 692 (1995). 
13  Id. at 692 & n.45. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 692-93; id. at 693 n.47 (“As gang research progressed, however, gangs were discovered in 
neighborhoods that were stable, though poor, where the same ethnic group had lived for an extended period of time.”); id. 
at 693 n.49 (“Researchers generally have not found gangs, or have not looked for them, in places other than slums.”). 
16  Id. at 693. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. at 693 n.50.  
19  Id. 
20  Joan Moore, Gangs, Drugs, and Violence, in GANGS: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY 
YOUTH GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES 27, 28 (Scott Cummings & Daniel J. Monti eds., 1993). 
21  See HERBERT C. COVEY ET AL., JUVENILE GANGS 100 (1992). Several explanations have been suggested 
for the temporary decline of gang activity in the 1960s. See id. at 100-01. One is that increased drug use among gang 
members caused the decline. Id. at 101. Another argument is that traditional gang activity decreased as gang involvement 
increased in the politics of the 1960s. Id. at 100-01. Many of the same people previously active in gangs were instead 
participating in the political and civil strife of the 1960s. Id. at 100-01. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss4/3
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began to combat gang violence, gang presence had spread to nearly every major city in the United 
States.
22
 A 2011 study estimated that there are about 1.4 million members in 33,000 active street 
gangs, motorcycle gangs, and prison gangs in the United States.
23
 This marked “a 40 percent 
increase from an estimated 1 million gang members in 2009.”
24
 Arizona, California, and Illinois 
have the highest number of gang members, but officials believe that the Northeast and Southeast 
regions increased the most in gang membership from 2009 to 2011.
25
 In 2011, gangs were 
believed to be responsible for nearly half of violent crimes in some cities, and up to ninety percent 
in several others.
26
 The National Gang Intelligence Center’s 2013 Report indicated that gang 
numbers have continued to increase since that time.
27
 In a nationwide survey of law enforcement 
personnel the same year, fifty-three percent of respondents indicated that gang membership had 
increased in their jurisdiction since 2011.
28
 
Los Angeles is the epicenter for gang activity in the United States.
29
 The rise of gang 
activity in California was dramatic in the 1980s.
30
 In 1981, an article in Time estimated that there 
were approximately 350 gangs comprised of 20,000 to 30,000 members in the Los Angeles area 
alone.
31
 Today, recent studies indicate that over 1,000 active street gangs exist in the Los Angeles 
area, with as many as 175,000 members in the seven major counties of Los Angeles, San Luis 
Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Orange.
32
 
It should come as no surprise, then, that the crime rate associated with gang activity has 
shown a similar increase. One scholar notes that “[f]rom 1981 to 2001, there were approximately 
10,000 gang homicides in the state of California, approximately seventy-five percent of which 
                                                                
22  Matthew Hardwick Blumenstein, Note, RICO Overreach: How the Federal Government’s Escalating 
Offensive Against Gangs Has Run Afoul of the Constitution, 62 VAND. L. REV. 211, 212 (2009) (“There are gangs in every 
state and in the District of Columbia.” (citing MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON THE GROWTH OF VIOLENT STREET GANGS IN SUBURBAN AREAS 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs27/27612/27612p.pdf)).  
23  NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 10, at 9. 
24  Id. at 11. 
25  Id. at 11-12. 
26  Id. at 9. 
27  See NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., 2013 NATIONAL GANG REPORT 9 (2013), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-report-2013/view (“Survey respondents indicate gang 
membership and gang-related crime in the United States continue to increase steadily.”). In January of 2013, the number 
of individuals murdered in Chicago surpassed the number of American troops killed in Afghanistan within the same time 
frame. Id. at 10. Experts attribute the rise in Chicago’s murder rate to fractionalized gangs battling for turf control. Id. 
28  Id. at 9. Additionally, fifty-eight percent of respondents indicated that gang criminal activity increased 
either slightly or significantly since 2011. Id. 
29  Combating Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 9; see also Gangs, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/content_basic_view/1396 (last visited June 18, 2015). 
30  Yoshino, supra note 3, at 117.  
31  Truman, supra note 12, at 694 n.57 (“A 1981 article in Time reported roughly 350 gangs with a total of 
20,000-30,000 members in Los Angeles.”) (citing Jane O’Reilly & Benjamin W. Cate, Combat at Hollywood and Vine, 
TIME, Aug. 24, 1981, at 27). 
32  VIOLENCE PREVENTION COAL. OF GREATER L.A., FACT SHEET: GANG VIOLENCE (2007), available at 
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/sciprc/pdf/GANG_VIOLENCE.pdf (citing Combating Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 9). 
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occurred in Los Angeles County.”
33
 The California Department of Justice reports that “[f]rom 
1998 to 2007, the number of gang related homicides increased by 16.1 percent.”
34
 Other estimates 
suggest that violent gang crime in Los Angeles County claims an average of one life per day,
35
 
and costs California taxpayers more than two billion dollars annually.
36
 
Law enforcement officials across the nation have attempted to find effective solutions to 
the gang problem.
37
 In California, various methods have been explored, but the consistent growth 
in gang numbers belies any claims of success.
38
 In response, “local and national law enforcement 
agencies have sharpened their focus on combating gangs.”
39
 The Los Angeles police “renewed 
‘crackdowns’ on gang activity and . . . increased ‘gang sweeps’ of neighborhoods where they 
believe[d] gang activity [was] high.”
40
 
A. California’s STEP Act 
These methods were met with little success, as California earned the dubious title of 
“street gang capital of the United States.”
41
 Even though the need for more assertive action was 
clear as early as the 1980s, it wasn’t until September 24, 1988, that California signed into law its 
first anti-gang bill, known as the Street Terrorism and Enforcement Act, or the “STEP Act.”
42
 
Declaring California in a “state of crisis” as a result of the activities of “violent street gangs 
whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes,” the STEP Act contained 
two key sections.
43
 The first created a substantive crime for active participation in “any criminal 
street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct 
                                                                
33  Yoshino, supra note 3, at 117-18 (footnote omitted) (citing George Tita & Allan Abrahamse, Gang 
Homicide in LA, 1981-2001, AT THE LOC. LEVEL: PERSP. ON VIOLENCE PREVENTION, Feb. 2004, at 1, 2). 
34  EDWARD G. BROWN JR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA 21 (2008), available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/homicide/hm07/preface.pdf. 
35  Introduction to Gangs, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/top_ten_most 
_wanted_gang_members/content_basic_view/23466 (last visited June 18, 2015) (“In Los Angeles County [the] violent 
acts [of gangs] claim an average of one life a day.”). 
36  ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, CITYWIDE GANG ACTIVITY REDUCTION STRATEGY: PHASE III REPORT 5 
(2007), available at http://advancementprojectca.org/sites/default/files/imce/p3_report.pdf. 
37  See Blumenstein, supra note 22; Christopher S. Yoo, Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining 
Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 212, 213 (1994).  
38  Yoo, supra note 37, at 214-15. 
39  Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s STEP Act, 18 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 679 (2009). 
40  Id. 
41  Truman, supra note 12, at 686. As recently as 2007, former “Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa 
asked the federal government for an additional thirty-million dollars to aid in [another gang] crackdown, . . . [as then-] 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared the state of California [prepared] to ‘declare a war on gangs.’” Van Hofwegen, 
supra note 39, at 680. 
42  Truman, supra note 12, at 707. 
43  CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2015); id. §§ 186.22(a)-(b). 
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by members of that gang.”
44
 The second imposed harsher punishments for crimes “committed for 
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang.”
45
 Although 
initially drafted with a sunset clause that would have repealed the STEP Act in 1992, the Act has 
been extended indefinitely.
46
 
The California legislature was initially careful to limit the scope of the STEP Act, 
making prosecutions under the new law “very difficult to prove except in the most egregious 
cases,”
47
 and taking careful note of the potential for infringement on the First Amendment 
freedom of association.
48
 The language of the original STEP Act limited prosecution to gang 
members who commit crimes with (1) knowledge of the prior commission of (2) two or more 
serious felonies by members of their gang.
49
 And while the Act’s text only requires knowledge for 
the substantive participation offense, a report from California’s Senate Judiciary Committee 
indicated the importance of that knowledge to the Act’s drafters.
50
 Moreover, the original 
statutorily enumerated offenses were limited to seven felonies: “assault with a deadly 
weapon . . . ; robbery; homicide or manslaughter; sale, manufacture, and possession for sale of 
narcotics; shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied vehicle; arson; and witness and victim 
intimidation.”
51
 Under these guidelines, only those people with knowledge of two “serious” 
offenses committed by their gang’s members faced prosecution under the STEP Act.
52
 
                                                                
44  CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a). 
45  Id. § 186.22(b). 
46  California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 1988 Cal Legis. Serv. 1242 (West) 
(codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-186.34 (West 2015)) (providing for automatic repeal by 1992); Act 
of Oct. 3, 2013, 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 508 (West) (extending STEP Act to 2017, with possibility for further 
extension). 
47  Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application of California’s Anti-
Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 114 (2006) (quoting CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS: 
AB 2013, Record No. 29069, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., at 4 (1988) (on file with the Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law)). 
48  CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2015). 
49  Baker, supra note 47, at 114. 
50  By reference to “more severe” punishment of gang crimes:  
[The sponsors of AB 2013] considered [the initial seven enumerated offenses] to be extremely 
serious crimes; in addition, they claim that these crimes are crimes which are typical of street gangs. 
Once a prosecutor established that any member of a gang had committed at least two of these 
crimes, the threshold for a pattern of criminal activity would be met. Any crime committed by a 
member in addition to this threshold would be punished more severely [under the provisions of the 
STEP Act].  
Id. at 114-15 (alterations in original) (quoting CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS: AB 2013, Record No. 
29069, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., at 4 (1988) (on file with the Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law)); see also id. at 103 n.10 (“The 
reason for the urgency [was] to provide the tools necessary for law enforcement to stem the tide of illegal gang warfare 
without infringing upon the constitutional rights of any individual, at the earliest possible time.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS: AB 2013, Record No. 29069, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., at 4 
(1988) (on file with the Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law))). 
51  Baker, supra note 47, at 114. 
52  Id. at 115. 
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B. Legislation Across the Country 
Following California’s lead, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have codified 
some form of anti-gang measures.
53
 Of the fifty states, thirty-one now have laws that enhance 
penalties for gang-related criminal acts, while twenty-eight states have passed gang-prevention 
laws.
54
 Some states, such as Louisiana, Georgia, and Missouri, have enacted legislation that are 
nearly carbon copies of California’s STEP Act, while others—like Florida, South Dakota, and 
Illinois—have moved in new directions.
55
 
In 1990, Florida passed its own STEP Act, which moved beyond the California Act by 
defining the term “youth and street gang member,”
56
 and offering a broader definition for the term 
“pattern of youth and street gang activity.”
57
 Under Florida’s STEP Act, “a person could meet the 
statutory definition of a gang member simply by living in [an area frequented by a gang and its 
participants], associating with [the gang’s members], and being stopped in the company of gang 
members more than four times.”
58
 While the creation of a definition for the term “youth and street 
                                                                
53  See Highlights of Gang-Related Legislation, NAT’L GANG CENTER, http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/ 
Legislation/Highlights (last updated Aug. 2014). 
54  Id.  
55  Truman, supra note 12, at 710-11. 
56  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(2) (West 1990). Florida law originally defined “youth and street gang 
member” as:  
[A] person who engages in a pattern of youth and street gang activity and meets two or more of the 
following criteria: 
(a) Admits to gang membership. 
(b) Is a youth under the age of 21 years who is identified as a gang member by a parent or 
guardian. 
(c) Is identified as a gang member by a documented reliable informant. 
(d) Resides in or frequents a particular gang’s area and adopts their style of dress, their use of 
hand signs, or their tattoos, and associates with known gang members. 
(e) Is identified as a gang member by an informant of previously untested reliability and such 
identification is corroborated by independent information. 
(f) Has been arrested more than once in the company of identified gang members for offenses 
which are consistent with usual gang activity. 
(g) Is identified as a gang member by physical evidence such as photographs or other 
documentation. 
(h) Has been stopped in the company of known gang members four or more times. 
Id. This definition has now been replaced by “criminal gang member” and the criteria have been modified and expanded. 
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West 2015). 
57  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West 1990). Rather than listing possible predicate offenses, Florida’s 
STEP Act originally defined a “[p]attern of youth and street gang activity” as “the commission, attempted commission, or 
solicitation . . . of two or more felony or violent misdemeanor offenses on separate occasions within a 3-year period, for 
the purpose of furthering gang activity.” Id. This definition has been removed from the most recent version of Florida’s 
STEP Act. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03 (West 2015). 
58  Truman, supra note 12, at 717. Currently, Florida’s anti-gang measures fail to assign time-related 
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gang member” would seem to offer firmer constitutional constraints than California’s STEP Act, 
the term actually left Florida’s Act susceptible to challenges on freedom of association grounds.
59
 
The Florida Act did not establish a substantive gang-participation crime, but it did enhance 
sentences for gang-related felonies, similar to the sentence enhancements of California’s STEP 
Act.
60
 
South Dakota’s anti-gang statute, passed not long after, models Florida’s. Although its 
definition of a “street gang member” omits Florida’s provision whereby a parent or guardian can 
identify an individual as a gang member,
61
 the bill is susceptible to the same freedom of 
association challenges as Florida’s anti-gang laws.
62
 
Illinois’s Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act (“STOP Act”) faces similar 
potential constitutional challenges for its definition of “gang member,”
 
which includes “any 
person who . . . voluntarily associates himself with a course or pattern of gang-related criminal 
activity.”
63
 Under this definition, a person who associates with gang members without actively 
participating in the gang itself could nevertheless face severe sentence enhancements.
64 
Unlike 
other states, however, Illinois’s STOP Act created a civil cause of action in favor of any public 
authority affected by gang activity.
65 
It additionally employed its own definitions for the terms 
“gang,”
66 
“course or pattern of criminal activity,”
67
 and “gang-related” crime.
68
 
                                                                
boundaries to the qualification of being observed in the company of gang members more than four times, noting only that 
“[o]bservation in a custodial setting requires a willful association. It is the intent of the Legislature to allow this criterion to 
be used to identify gang members who recruit and organize in jails, prisons, and other detention settings.” FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 874.03(2)(j) (West 2015). 
59  See Truman, supra note 12, at 717. The modern term, “criminal gang member,” is still just as susceptible. 
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West 2015). 
60  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.04 (West 2015); see also Baker, supra note 47, at 114-15. 
61  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10A-1 (2014). 
62  Truman, supra note 12, at 717-18. 
63  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/10 (West 2015). Gang members include: 
 [A]ny person who actually and in fact belongs to a gang, and any person who knowingly acts in the 
capacity of an agent for or accessory to, or is legally accountable for, or voluntarily associates 
himself with a course or pattern of gang-related criminal activity, or who knowingly performs, aids, 
or abets any such activity.  
Id. 
64  Active participation is not a required element stated under the Illinois STOP Act. See Truman, supra note 
12, at 717.  
65  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (2015) (creating a civil cause of action in favor of public 
authorities that have incurred costs due to criminal activity). 
66  Id. at 147/10 (defining “street gang” or “gang” as “any combination, confederation, alliance, network, 
conspiracy, understanding, or other similar conjoining . . . of 3 or more persons with an established hierarchy that, through 
its membership or through the agency of any member engages in a course or pattern of criminal activity”). 
67  Id. (defining a “[c]ourse or pattern of criminal activity” as “2 or more gang-related criminal offenses,” at 
least one of which is a felony, “committed within 5 years of each other”). 
68  Id. Gang-related crimes include those committed:  
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Other states, like Indiana, offer different definitions for key terms,
69
 and several states, 
like Arkansas, use entirely different approaches to codifying anti-gang measures by basing their 
legislation on the federal Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) statute.
70
 Unlike the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (or the “RICO Act,” which serves as the basis for anti-
gang legislation such as California’s),
71
 the CCE focuses on organizations that deal with drug 
trafficking and similar offenses.
72
 Rather than focusing on participation in criminal gangs, 
Arkansas’ bill focuses on enhanced punishments for criminal gang activity and the real property 
used by criminal gangs, organizations, or enterprises.
73
 Neither Indiana’s nor Arkansas’ efforts 
have been declared unconstitutional yet.
74
 Indiana, in particular, has seen constitutional challenges 
specific to freedom of association interests, but since the state legislature amended the statute’s 
language in 1994,
75
 it has been upheld as constitutional against all challenges.
76
 
                                                                
(1) with the intent to increase the gang’s size, membership, prestige, dominance, or control in any 
geographical area; or  
(2) with the intent to provide the gang with any advantage in, or any control . . . over any criminal 
market sector, . . . ; or  
(3) with the intent to exact revenge or retribution for the gang or any member of the gang;  
(4) with the intent to obstruct justice, or intimidate or eliminate any witness against the gang or any 
member of the gang; or  
(5) with the intent to otherwise directly or indirectly cause any benefit, aggrandizement, gain, profit 
or other advantage whatsoever to or for the gang, its reputation, influence, or membership. 
Id. 
69  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-9-1 (West 2015) (defining “criminal gang” as “a group with at least 
three . . . members that specifically: (1) either: (A) promotes, sponsors, or assists in; or (B) participates in; or (2) requires 
as a condition of membership or continued membership; the commission of a felony or an act that would be a felony if 
committed by an adult or the offense of battery.” (citation omitted)).  
70  Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-104 (West 2015) with 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012). See also Truman, 
supra note 12, at 712 n.151 (noting that “Arkansas’ Criminal Gang, Organization or Enterprise Act is modeled on the 
federal Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute”). 
71  Truman, supra note 12, at 712 n.151. 
72  21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012); KENNETH CARLSON & PETER FINN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PROSECUTING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES 1 (1993). 
73  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-104 (West 2015) (enhancing felony classifications); id. § 5-74-109 (declaring as 
a common nuisance “[a]ny premises, building, or place used to facilitate the commission of a continuing series of 
three . . . or more criminal violations”). 
74  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 969 S.W.2d 618, 620-21 (Ark. 1998) (upholding Arkansas’ statute against 
vagueness challenge because the law “conveys fair and sufficient warning when measured by common understanding.”). 
75  Act of Mar. 15, 1994, 1994 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 140-1994 (West) (amending IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-
9-1 (West1991)) (replacing the word “and” at the end of clause (1) with “or”). 
76  See, e.g., Klein v. State, 698 N.E.2d 296, 299-300 (Ind. 1998) (rejecting a freedom of association 
challenge and ruling that “neither the U.S. nor the Indiana Constitution protects associations made in furtherance of crimes 
or criminal conspiracies”). 
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C. Expanding Anti-Gang Efforts 
Amidst shifting precedents and amending legislation, California’s STEP Act has 
increased exponentially in scope since its inception.
77
 Beginning in 1996, the California Supreme 
Court suggested, in People v. Gardeley, that the second predicate offense may be charged 
contemporaneously with a count of active participation in a criminal street gang.
78
 This ruling 
appeared to violate the legislature’s original intent to put potential STEP Act violators on notice 
of liability, because in effect, it reduced the qualitative crime requirement to a single incident. 
Four years later in 2000, the California electorate, through Proposition 21, expanded the list of 
enumerated crimes listed in the STEP Act.
79
, Additions by the legislature also increased the 
number of offenses.
80
 Today, the original list of seven now encompasses thirty-three offenses, 
including the comparatively minor crimes of felony vandalism and automobile burglary.
81
 A 
subsequent appellate decision expanded the STEP Act’s scope even further, first by confirming 
that the predicate offenses do not have to be gang-related,
82
 and then ruling that people who 
commit those predicate acts do not even have to be gang members at the time of commission.
83
 
Despite these efforts to expand the scope of the STEP Act, gang activity continues to rise in 
California, and the County and City of Los Angeles continue to be recognized as the “gang 
capital” of the United States.
84
 
Given the enormity of gang violence, there was a need for legislation designed to cope 
with the problem. The rub, of course, is tailoring the remedy to meet the challenge, while not 
violating the constitutional rights of those who fall within its purview or abusing the vast 
discretion allotted to police and prosecutors. Nonetheless, given the very nature of the legislation, 
it is clear that constitutional challenges will continue to be mounted. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
“The Constitution does not permit a legislature to ‘set a net large enough to 
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who 
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.’”
85
 
Without question, the process of codifying anti-gang measures will continue to face 
                                                                
77  See Baker, supra note 47, at 115. 
78  See People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 725-26 (Cal. 1996) (identifying one episode of assault by gang 
members as “sufficient to establish not only the commission by gang members of assault with a deadly weapon, but also 
the attempted commission by gang members of murder”). 
79  See Baker, supra note 47, at 115. 
80  Id. 
81  See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2015). 
82  People v. Augborne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting holding of Gardeley, 927 
P.2d at 723). 
83  Id. at 263-64. 
84  See Truman, supra note 12, at 686 & n.13. 
85  City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 
(1876)). 
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challenges on several constitutional fronts, including concerns regarding freedom of association, 
vagueness, overbreadth, and due process. The problem with examining those issues separately is 
that constitutional challenges naturally bleed together; a statute that is vague or overbroad 
frequently will infringe First Amendment association rights, violate due process protections, or 
result in a combination thereof. This section will attempt to break those issues down, while 
recognizing their natural overlap. 
The First Amendment declares: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right 
of the people to peaceably assemble.”
86
 Throughout history, various groups have successfully 
extended this First Amendment right, and have engaged in political, social, legal, economic, 
religious, and cultural activities without infringement by the government.
87
 But what of criminal 
street gangs? On one level this inquiry is basic, because they are criminal and thus not involved in 
any “safe” or legal group dynamic. On another level, however, should citizens be denied their 
constitutional rights to freely assemble merely because of the classification of the group of people 
with whom they choose to associate? Ultimately, though, courts have long acknowledged that 
criminal street gangs are not owed First Amendment protection, as “the act of associating with 
compatriots in crime is not a protected associational right.”
88
 The battle therefore is not over the 
protection of criminal street gangs, but rather who is included in the definition of the “gang” for 
purposes of prosecution. Further, the legislative challenge is not so much in identifying gangs, 
although that is a factor, but rather in determining which individuals are to be caught up in the 
gang dragnet. 
A. Freedom of Association: Gang Participation and Vagueness 
The United States Supreme Court first faced this issue in the 1950s, as the Cold War 
raged, and the country was immersed in the Red Scare.
89
 Scales v. United States challenged the 
constitutionality of the Smith Act, which was passed by Congress in 1940 in the hope of 
combating the influence of the Communist Party of the United States (“CPUSA”).
90
 The 
defendant, Junius Scales, the leader of the North Carolina branch of the CPUSA, was arrested 
under the Smith Act, which criminalized the actions of any person who “becomes or is a member 
of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons”
91
 or “who teach[es], 
advocate[s], or encourage[s] the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or 
violence.”
92
 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan recognized that the First Amendment 
prevents any state from criminalizing mere association with any group, absent affirmative conduct 
                                                                
86  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
87  Alexander A. Molina, California’s Anti-Gang Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act: One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 22 SW. U. L. REV. 457, 463 (1993). 
88  Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ind. App. 1993). 
89  See generally Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957) (affirming conviction for contempt where 
witness refused to identify individuals as Communists); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding 
conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act against First Amendment challenge). 
90  Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
91  18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012). 
92  Id.; Scales, 367 U.S. at 244. 
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by the individual,
93
 but added that “[w]e can discern no reason why membership, when it 
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this . . . forbidden advocacy, 
should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of [the First] Amendment.”
94
 
The Court upheld the Act, concluding that it allowed punishment only where there is clear proof 
that a defendant “specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to 
violence.”
95
 Inherent in this requirement was specific knowledge by the prosecuted individual of 
the organization’s illegal advocacy, which the Court later noted “was intimately connected with 
the construction limiting membership to ‘active’ members.”
96
 This limitation, the Court ruled, 
“does not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with ‘the substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.’”
97
 
Three years later, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the Court was asked to evaluate 
another law limiting the CPUSA. Aptheker focused on the constitutionality of a section of the 
Subversive Activities Control Act, which made it unlawful for any member of a registered 
Communist organization to apply for, use, or attempt to use a U.S. passport.
98
 Recognizing that 
“freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech and 
association,”
99
 the Court drew a clear distinction between the Smith Act’s limiting language, and 
the much broader scope of the Subversive Activities Control Act. 
Where the Smith Act’s punishment required active participation, the Court in Aptheker 
noted that the Subversive Activities Control Act “renders irrelevant” a person’s degree of 
participation in an organization and “his commitment to its purpose.”
100
 Most important, the Court 
emphasized the Smith Act’s requirement of specific knowledge, which it considered “intimately 
connected with the construction limiting membership to ‘active’ members.”
101
 It cannot be 
assumed that all “members” of a group participate in its illegal activities simply based on their 
association.
102
 Moreover, the Court noted that the idea that a person could regain the ability to 
travel with a U.S. passport by renouncing his or her Communist affiliations in “good faith” was 
not enough to mitigate the limiting effects of the legislation, because it intrinsically curtailed an 
individual’s right to associate freely.
103
 This failure to distinguish between active participants and 
                                                                
93  Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-25 (explaining that “[m]embership, without more, in an organization engaged in 
illegal advocacy” is not “sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt”). 
94  Id. at 229. Justice Harlan noted that there is a general protection for association under the First 
Amendment, but that protection does not extend to criminal associations. See id. 
95  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)). 
96  Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511 n.9 (1964). 
97  Scales, 367 U.S. at 229 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). 
98  Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 501-02; 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1988) (declaring that “it shall be unlawful for any 
member of [a Communist organization] . . . to make application for a passport, or . . . to use or attempt to use any such 
passport”) (repealed 1993). 
99  Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 517. 
100  Id. at 510. 
101  Id. at 511 n.9. 
102  The Court cited Justice Murphy who opined that “men in adhering to a political party or other 
organization notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles.” Id. at 510 (quoting 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1943)). 
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mere sympathizers constituted a violation of First Amendment freedoms.
104
 
Several years later, the Court invalidated another provision
105
 of the Subversive 
Activities Control Act in United States v. Robel, ruling that it also failed to draw the distinction 
between peripheral members and leadership figures.
106
 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the 
majority, stated that the statute “casts its net across a broad range of associational activities”
107
 
and “quite literally establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that an 
individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government in proscribing it.”
108
 
Echoed throughout a number of opinions analyzing organizations and the First 
Amendment was the caveat that “[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so 
closely touching our most precious freedoms.”
109
 Since the 1950s, this caution has not changed, 
and has not been limited to cases involving political organizations.
110
 
Perhaps recognizing the landscape shaped by the Supreme Court, the California 
legislature attempted to craft the STEP Act to punish gang members only when they actively, 
knowingly, and willfully participate in a gang’s criminal activity.
111
 Because of this limiting 
language, California’s courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the STEP Act 
against freedom of association claims.
112
 However, in People v. Castenada, the California 
Supreme Court was confronted with a gang conviction without a showing of actual gang 
membership.
113
 Castenada was charged with criminal gang participation based on the fact that his 
alleged armed robbery took place in known gang territory, and because Castenada himself had 
been seen in the company of gang members several times previously.
114
 Reasoning that to be 
                                                                
103  Id. at 507 (“Since freedom of association is itself guaranteed in the First Amendment, restrictions 
imposed upon the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be fully exercised if the 
individual would first yield up his membership in a given association.”) (footnote omitted). 
104  See generally id. at 510-14 (finding the statute insufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny). 
105  50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1988) (repealed 1993) (making it unlawful for a member of a Communist 
organization “to engage in any employment in any defense facility”). 
106  United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967). 
107  Id. at 265-66. 
108  Id. at 265; see also id. at 262 (“It is precisely because the statute sweeps indiscriminately across all types 
of association with Communist-action groups, without regard to the quality and degree of membership, that it runs afoul of 
the First Amendment.”). 
109  Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (noting that “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and 
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can 
be more narrowly achieved.”). See generally supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. 
110  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39-40 (2010) (upholding a statute criminalizing 
participation in a foreign terrorist organization because the law targeted active members with precision). 
111  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a)-(e) (West 2015). 
112  See, e.g., People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 284-85 (Cal. 2000) (explaining that the STEP Act “imposes 
criminal liability not for lawful association, but only when a defendant ‘actively participates’ in a criminal street gang”). 
113  Id. at 285. 
114  See id. at 280 (“Seven times between August 1994 and October 16, 1995, the date of the crimes here, 
Santa Ana police officers saw defendant in the presence of known Goldenwest gang members; on three of these occasions 
they gave him written notice that Goldenwest was a criminal street gang. At those times, defendant bragged to the officers 
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convicted of gang participation, a defendant must actively participate both with knowledge and 
with the aim of furthering the gang’s criminal conduct,
115
 the California court lowered the 
threshold for active participation to only encompass “involvement with a criminal street gang that 
is more than nominal or passive.”
116
 The challenge then for the California courts was to further 
define not only the requisite active participation, but the other two key terms of “knowingly” and 
“willfully.” Such inquiries lead directly to questions of vagueness and overbreadth. 
Is California’s STEP Act so vague that people “of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”?
117
 Given that statutory language must clearly 
define each element of criminal behavior and foreclose any discretionary interpretation by 
prosecutors or judges, it follows that vague statutes can have a profound effect upon freedom of 
association, as people may choose not to exercise this First Amendment protection, rather than 
risk violating a statute they cannot understand or interpret. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in City of Chicago v. Morales,
118
 provided some clarity with 
which to gauge California’s STEP Act. The Court examined a municipal ordinance in Chicago 
that levied fines and possible prison sentences on individuals found loitering—provided police 
officers believed the individual to be a gang member.
119
 Noting that “the city cannot conceivably 
have meant to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in public with a gang member,”
120
 the 
Court ruled the entire statute to be unconstitutionally vague “not in the sense that it requires a 
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather 
                                                                
that he ‘kicked back’ with Goldenwest members and ‘backed them up,’ but he denied having been initiated into the gang.” 
(alteration in original)). 
115  Id. at 282-83. 
116  Id. at 281. A California appellate court had previously interpreted the active participation requirement as 
requiring a showing of that the defendant “devote[d] all, or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the criminal street 
gang.” People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) abrogated by Castenada, 3 P.3d 278. 
117  Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
118  City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
119  Id. at 47. At that time, the Chicago Municipal Code stated: 
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal street 
gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such 
persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey 
such an order is in violation of this section.  
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no person who was 
observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.  
(c) As used in this section:  
(1) ‘Loiter’ means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose  
(2) ‘Criminal street gang’ means any ongoing organization, association in fact or group of 
three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its substantial activities 
the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose 
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
activity. 
Id. at 46 n.2 (quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
120  Morales, 527 U.S. at 57. 
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in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”
121
 By failing to offer even minimal 
guidelines for appropriate enforcement,
122
 the statute did not provide those crucial standards 
“sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.”
123
 
Conversely, California’s STEP Act, according to California’s highest court, does not 
suffer from a similar lack of specificity. The California court concluded that by using the “plainly 
worded requirements” of criminal knowledge, willful promotion, and active participation,
124
 the 
statute made it “reasonably clear what conduct is prohibited.”
125
 By contrast, Chicago’s ordinance 
left the door open to broad interpretation as to the precise conduct that was deemed criminal. 
In answer to vagueness concerns, as well as freedom of association concerns, the most 
common approach in anti-gang legislation has been for legislatures to require active participation 
in the gang as well as knowledge of the criminal activity by the gang.
126
 Mere association with 
gang members without knowledge of the gang’s criminal activity is insufficient as vague.
127
 
B. Overbreadth Problems: Defining Gang Membership 
The concept of overbreadth is not unlike that of vagueness: “[a] statute is considered to 
be overbroad if in addition to the undesirable behavior, it includes constitutionally protected 
activities, especially those related to free expression or free association.”
128
 
Beyond those issues dealing with “gang participation” is the equally nettlesome issue of 
who is a gang member. It is of no help that California’s STEP Act does not define the term “gang 
member.”
129
 Despite the conclusion of the California appellate court, in People v. Green, that the 
word “member” is a term of “ordinary meaning, and require[s] no further definition,”
130
 the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that the term “known to be a member” was unconstitutionally 
                                                                
121  Id. at 60 (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122  See Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 455 (1905) (“The power to determine the meaning of a statute 
carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations as well as the method by which they shall be determined.”). 
123  Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)). 
124  People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 285 (Cal. 2000).  
125  Id. 
126  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-4 (West 2015); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-45-9-3 (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.2 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.423 (West 2015); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.168 (West 2014). 
127  In the author’s experience, courts, legislators, and scholars occasionally confuse the terms “vague” and 
“overbroad.” For a concise formulation of the overbreadth doctrine, see People v. Rokicki, 718 N.E.2d 333, 338 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1999) (defining a statute as overbroad if it “(1) criminalizes a substantial amount of protected behavior, relative to the 
law’s plainly legitimate sweep, and (2) is not susceptible to a limiting construction that avoids constitutional problems.”). 
See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (rejecting overbreadth challenge and delineating substantial 
overbreadth approach). For an example of a Supreme Court opinion invalidating a statute for vagueness, see Morales, 527 
U.S. at 50-51 (holding that the city ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed enforcement against loiters 
engaged in entirely “innocent” activities).  
128  Bjerregaard, supra note 11, at 35. 
129  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2015). 
130  People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) abrogated by People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 
278 (Cal. 2000). 
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vague nearly half a century earlier in Lanzetta v. New Jersey.
131
 
Lanzetta and two others were brought before the Court, accused of violating a New 
Jersey statute that read, in pertinent part: “Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, 
known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at 
least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime . . . is 
declared to be a gangster.”
132
 Faced with five to ten years of hard labor following their conviction 
as “gangsters,” the defendants appealed, arguing that the language of the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague.
133
 Noting that “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or 
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes,”
134
 the Lanzetta Court found that the 
term “gang” and the phrase “known to be a member” were “so vague, indefinite and uncertain” as 
to constitute a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
135
 In its decision, the Court cited a 
well-known rule from Connally v. General Construction Co., requiring that the average person 
must be made aware of potential criminal liability.
136
 A solution which would eliminate the 
constitutional challenges related to vagueness and overbreadth is for legislators to simply omit 
associative words like “member” and “membership” altogether from anti-gang legislation. 
Although “member” and “membership” have at times been deemed “terms of ordinary 
meaning,”
137
 their definitions only relate to the word’s textual use, and leave the application of the 
word ambiguous. Specifically, in regards to the word “member,” who decides whether someone is 
a “member”? Using our earlier example, what if Ezequiel does not consider himself to be a 
member of the Salinas gang, but the leader of the Salinas gang does?
138
 Conversely, what if 
Ezequiel believes himself to be a member of the gang, but the leader has not yet accepted him into 
the gang? At what point would Ezequiel be considered a member of the Salinas gang? And at 
whose discretion?
139
 As discussed earlier, California’s STEP Act allows punishment for “[a]ny 
person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members 
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, 
                                                                
131  Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939). 
132  Id. at 452. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 453. 
135  Id. at 458. 
136  Id. at 453 (“[T]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform 
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized 
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926))). 
137  People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) abrogated by People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 
278 (Cal. 2000). 
138  See supra Introduction. 
139  See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 621-22 (Cal. 1997) (“Law enforcement officials admit 
that there are many different levels of [gang] membership. . . . Thus, to simply identify a person as a ‘gang member’ 
conveys little about that person’s true level of involvement or activity.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Susan L. 
Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 750 (1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.”
140
 Thus, to punish 
a person for conducting criminal gang activity, California must determine and prove who the 
other members of the gang are, and that they either currently engage “or have engaged in a pattern 
of criminal gang activity.”
141
 Simply omitting the membership requirement from the Act would 
eliminate any misunderstanding or confusion that arises from the complications associated with 
determining the membership status in a criminal street gang. California’s STEP Act, as it 
currently reads, permits an innocent person to be accused and convicted as a gang member, while 
a guilty “gangbanger” may roam free because of a prosecution’s potential failure to prove the 
gangbanger’s membership status. To avoid this inconsistency, the statute could be worded as 
follows: Any person who actively and knowingly participates in any criminal gang activity (as 
defined under California Penal Code § 186.22(e)), and who willfully promotes, furthers, or 
assists another in committing any felonious criminal gang activity shall be punished . . . . This 
simply-worded requirement would allow prosecutors to focus on prosecuting actual criminal gang 
activity without expending valuable time and resources determining who is or is not considered a 
“member” of a gang. 
Unfortunately, rather than eliminating the problem by striking the membership 
requirement, California’s counties have spent a considerable amount of judicial time and 
resources attempting to address the membership question. The problem is that nearly all counties 
have addressed it differently. For example, a person may be arrested as a gang member in 
Stanislaus County for meeting two or more out of eight possible criteria—including past arrests 
on suspicion of offenses consistent with usual gang activity and identification by an informant as 
a gang member.
142
 
In San Diego, however, there are nine total criteria to qualify as a gang member; a person 
must meet at least three upon a single contact with police, or one or more across successive 
contacts.
143
 California defense attorney Martin Baker points out that “a person who has . . . been 
                                                                
140  CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2015). 
141  Id. 
142  All eight criteria are as follows:  
1. Admit to being a gang member.  
2. Have been arrested on suspicion of offenses consistent with usual gang activity.  
3. Have been identified as a gang member by an informant.  
4. Have been seen affiliating with documented gang members.  
5. Have been seen displaying gang symbols [or] hand signs.  
6. Have been seen wearing gang dress or having gang paraphernalia.  
7. Have gang tattoos.  
8. [Have been] seen frequenting gang areas.  
Baker, supra note 47, at 110. 
143  San Diego’s criteria are as follows:  
1. Subject has admitted to being a gang member. 
2. Subject has been arrested alone or with known gang members for offenses consistent with usual 
gang activity.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss4/3
REELING IN GANG PROSECUTION - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2015  12:42 PM 
2015] REELING IN GANG PROSECUTION 359 
contacted by police [three times] while visiting [a family member or friend] in a ‘gang area’ 
[could be arrested] as a gang member in San Diego, but not in Stanislaus County.”
144
 In order to 
know with certainty, a person must research the gang criteria in any given county—a warning that 
is even posted on a Los Angeles Police Department website detailing gang member criteria in Los 
Angeles.
145
 As it stands, therefore, an individual must guess—at peril to his liberty and property—
as to whether he qualifies as a gang member in his jurisdiction. 
One common method states use “to mitigate challenges of overbreadth is to explicitly 
exclude constitutionally protected activity from the scope of the statute.”
146
 For example, anti-
gang legislation in Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana recognize “‘the 
right of every citizen to harbor and constitutionally express beliefs on any lawful subject 
whatsoever, to associate lawfully with others who share similar beliefs, to petition lawfully 
constituted authority for a redress of perceived grievances, and to participate in the electoral 
process,’ and that ‘it is not the intent of this subchapter to interfere with the constitutional exercise 
of the protected rights and freedoms of expression and association.’”
147
 The rub with the above 
statement is the unnecessary use of the word “lawfully.” Does not the First Amendment protect 
the right of every citizen to constitutionally express his or her beliefs on any subject, regardless of 
the lawfulness of the subject?
148
 And what about the right to associate?
149
 And the right to petition 
for redress of grievances?
150
 By inserting the words “lawful” and “lawfully,” the legislation 
enables the prosecutor to potentially restrict and define which types of constitutionally protected 
rights are “lawful.” To correct the legislation’s attempt to limit its citizens’ constitutional rights, 
the words “lawful” and “lawfully” should be removed from their current locations in the statute. 
In order to recapture the legislators’ likely intent, the statute could read, in pertinent part, “the 
                                                                
3. Subject has been identified as a gang member by a reliable informant [or] source.  
4. Subject has been identified as a gang member by an untested informant.  
5. Subject has been seen affiliating with documented gang members.  
6. Subject has been seen displaying symbols [or] hand signs.  
7. Subject has been seen frequenting gang areas.  
8. Subject has been seen wearing gang dress.  
9. Subject is known to have gang tattoos.  
Id. at 111.  
144  Id. 
145  How Are Gangs Identified, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/ 
get_informed/content_basic_view/23468 (noting that individuals looking for information about the identification of gang 
members outside the city of Los Angeles must “check with [their] local law enforcement agency for current information”) 
(last visited June 18, 2015). 
146  Bjerregaard, supra note 11, at 38. 
147  Id. at 38-39; (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-102(a) (2014)); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 
(West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.02(1) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-2(a) (West 2015); 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 147/5(a) (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1402(A) (2014). 
148  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
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right of every law-abiding citizen”—thus still prohibiting any unlawful conduct (as defined by 
state statute), but also respecting the constitutional rights granted to each citizen by our country’s 
founders. 
As one commentator sagely stated, “in many instances, legislatures attempt to address 
overbreadth a priori by explicitly indicating a compelling state interest and maintaining that the 
statutes do not infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.”
151
 Often, these mitigating efforts 
attempt to protect legislation against both vagueness and overbreadth challenges.
152
 
“As with vague laws, statutes that are overbroad may deter citizens from practicing their 
First Amendment rights and may grant law enforcement officials too much discretion, leading to 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.”
153
 As a result, anti-gang legislation must meet a 
heightened standard by including statutorily limiting constructions in an effort to protect 
constitutional freedoms.
154
 Requiring active participation along with knowledge of the group’s 
criminal activities and imposing a specific intent requirement narrows the potential reach of the 
statute. 
Furthermore, the right to associate to advance one’s beliefs and viewpoints is undeniably 
considered an aspect of “liberty” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
155
 Not only does the First Amendment explicitly assure the right, but the “First 
Amendment . . . freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs is 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any State.”
156
 
III. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTORS 
“The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not . . . be discouraged.”
157
 
Justice Sutherland, writing for the United State Supreme Court, once described the 
prosecutor as a “servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. . . . It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”
158
 
Justice Douglas warned that “[t]he function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not 
to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of 
people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial.”
159
 
In that dual role, a prosecutor must properly evaluate the weight of the evidence against a 
                                                                
151  Bjerregaard, supra note 11, at 39. 
152  Id. (noting that “methods utilized by legislatures to avoid vagueness challenges also help to mitigate 
overbreadth challenges”). 
153  Id. at 35-36. 
154  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). 
155  Molina, supra note 87, at 462. 
156  Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 107-08 (1981). 
157  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995). 
158  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
159  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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particular defendant,
160
 file only appropriate charges,
161
 not engage in coercive plea 
negotiations,
162 
comply with all discovery obligations,
163
 and, should the matter go to trial, 
conduct herself not just as the defendant’s adversary, but also as the “guardian of the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.”
164
 She must not allow pressure from victims, supervisors, or the community 
to unfairly influence her prosecutorial decisions,
165
 because, while a prosecutor has the right—and 
even the obligation—to “strike hard blows, [she] is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much 
[a prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”
166
 
The problem is that there are relatively few safeguards to protect against prosecutorial 
misconduct. Judicial opinions refer only to the abstract idea of a prosecutor’s role, without the 
specificity needed to constitute guidance.
167
 The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) are similarly vague, and place the dubious responsibility 
of reporting attorney misconduct on all lawyers: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to 
that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the 
appropriate professional authority.”
168
 
Noting the lack of guidance, the Model Rules adopted several general guidelines 
                                                                
160  See Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2976 (2010). 
161  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (“A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best 
judgment . . . in deciding which suits to bring . . . .”); see also Prosecutorial Discretion, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC. 209, 220 (2007) (“[T]he Due Process Clause prohibits a prosecutor from bringing a more serious charge against a 
defendant who has pursued a statutory right of appeal from a conviction on a lesser charge for the same offense.”) (citing 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974)); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform 
of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 240 (2006) (“[P]rosecutors 
should only charge a defendant with those offenses that adequately describe the defendant’s conduct, based on conduct 
that is not socially innocuous.”). 
162  See Langer, supra note 161, at 237 (stating that a prosecutor should not bring or threaten charges “where 
admissible evidence does not exist to support the charges” or where she “has no good faith intention of pursuing” them 
(quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.1(h) (3d ed. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). 
163  See FED R. CRIM. P. 16(a). 
164  People v. Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 27 (Cal Ct. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Trevino, 704 P.2d 
719, 725 (Cal. 1985)); see United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The prosecutor’s job isn’t just to 
win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules.”). 
165  See Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1323 (“While lawyers representing private parties may—indeed, must—do 
everything ethically permissible to advance their clients’ interests, lawyers representing the government in criminal cases 
serve truth and justice first.”). 
166  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
167  See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1362-63 (2011) (listing rules governing prosecutors 
behavior without explanation); see also Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 431 n.156 (2011) (characterizing the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice as a response to the dearth of guidance in state ethical codes). 
168  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2008). The comment accompanying Rule 8.3 further 
clarifies that “[t]he term ‘substantial’ refers to the seriousness of the possible offense.” Id. at cmt. 3. 
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regarding “the postures lawyers should take in a variety of situations,”
169
 but the only distinction 
drawn between attorneys in general and prosecutors in particular was that “[t]he responsibility of 
a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely 
to convict.”
170
 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for Criminal Justice also 
developed a model set of standards for prosecutors, but those guidelines suffered from the same 
lack of specificity.
171
 Neither offer concrete rules of conduct, nor do they outline specific 
consequences for errant behavior. 
When prosecutors do not adhere to the rules, the criminal “justice” system ceases to mete 
out justice.
172
 In 1999, two reporters at the Chicago Tribune explored the actions of prosecutors in 
the wake of Brady v. Maryland,
173
 the seminal case requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory 
evidence.
174
 The reporters opened a five-part series with a scathing critique: “With impunity, 
prosecutors across the country have violated their oaths and the law, committing the worst kinds 
of deception in the most serious of cases.”
175
 Sadly, the article’s bitter truth is exemplified by the 
actions of former Judge Ken Anderson who, while still a Texas prosecutor, withheld exonerating 
evidence which led to the wrongful conviction of an innocent man.
176
 In an all-too-rare 
occurrence,
177
 Anderson was sentenced to ten days in jail.
178
 
By its nature, the criminal justice system places tremendous discretion in the hands of 
                                                                
169  Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm 
of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 224 n.2 (1993). 
170  KATHLEEN RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A 
REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009, 44 (2010) (quoting ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
171  The only guidelines offered by the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice are invectives “to guard the 
rights of the accused and those of society.” See id. at 90 n.97; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2 cmt. (3d. ed. 1993) (“[I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor’s obligation is to 
protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the 
public.”). 
172  See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 10, 1999), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-01-10/news/9901100269_1_retrials-and-appeals-conviction-prosecutors (“Since a 
1963 U.S. Supreme Court ruling designed to curb misconduct by prosecutors, at least 381 defendants nationally have had a 
homicide conviction thrown out because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting innocence or presented evidence they 
knew to be false. Of all the ways that prosecutors can cheat, those two are considered the worst by the courts. And that 
number represents only a fraction of how often such cheating occurs.”). 
173  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
174  Id. at 87; see Armstrong, supra note 172. 
175  Armstrong, supra note 172. 
176  Associated Press, Ex-Prosecutor in Texas is Punished for a Wrongful Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/us/ex-prosecutor-is-punished-for-a-wrongful-conviction.html. 
177  See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 172 (noting that not a single prosecutor was convicted of a crime 
despite the finding of 381 wrongful homicide convictions between the years of 1963 and 1999 and a declaration by the 
U.S. Supreme Court that “such [Brady] misconduct by prosecutors [is] so reprehensible that it warrants criminal charges 
and disbarment”).  
178  Chuck Lindell, Ken Anderson to Serve 10 Days in Jail, STATESMAN (Nov. 8, 2013, 5:02 PM), 
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/ken-anderson-to-serve-10-days-in-jail/nbmsH/.  
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prosecutors. Prosecutors are the only actors entitled to all of the evidence generated by law 
enforcement and, absent a court order, they choose when and what information to release. 
Prosecutors hold the exclusive power, acting under the umbrella of the executive branch, to 
“determine whom to charge with public offenses and what charges to bring.”
179
 And, because of 
the separation of powers, a prosecutor’s discretion in charging is generally “not subject to 
supervision by the judicial branch.”
180
 When used appropriately, this discretion allows for those 
prosecutors most familiar with the cases to make the initial charging decision in light of “the 
complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law 
enforcement.”
181
 Problems arise, however, when prosecutors abuse this discretion. 
IV. THE POTENTIAL ABUSE OF ANTI-GANG LEGISLATION 
Anti-gang legislation, with its array of potential charges and enhancements, is an area 
ripe for the abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Such abuse is most often generated by filing charges 
and enhancements unwarranted or disproportionate to the conduct of the accused.
182
 Overfiling 
can result in a number of abuses. First, it can (and often does) lead to coercive plea-bargaining.
183
 
Second, inclusion of any gang-related charges allows for the introduction of otherwise 
impermissible and highly prejudicial testimony.
184
 Finally, should an accused opt for trial and 
suffer a conviction, the sentence could well reflect the enhanced charges. Each of these concerns 
is addressed below. 
  
                                                                
179  Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 13 (Cal. 2002) (quoting People v. Birks, 960 P.2d 1073, 1089 
(1998)).  
180  Id.  
181  Id. (quoting People v. Keenan 758 P.2d 1081, 1098 (1988) (quoting People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776, 
788 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
182  See H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 
63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 62 (2013) (“Charging a greater offense than the defendant’s conduct warrants, or adding an 
enhancement of little merit, gives an unfair advantage to the prosecutor.”). 
183  Id. at 63 (“Overcharging to gain a competitive advantage in the give-and-take of plea bargaining is an 
insidious abuse of the prosecutor’s power.”); see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006) (“[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even 
Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining 
purposes. This often results in individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter sentences than other individuals 
who are less morally culpable but take a chance and go to trial.” (footnote omitted)). 
184  See Mitchell Eisen et al., Probative or Prejudicial: Can Gang Evidence Trump Reasonable Doubt?, 62 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 4 (2014) (“It is fair to say that when the word ‘gang’ is used in Los Angeles County, one 
does not have visions of the characters from the ‘Our Little Gang’ series. The word gang . . . connotes opprobrious 
implications.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Perez, 170 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981))).  
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A. Overfiling and Coercive Plea-Bargaining 
Plea-bargaining is “an essential component of the administration of justice.”
185
 Plea- and 
sentence-bargaining—conducted by prosecutors adhering to their ethical obligations—is critical 
to the functioning of our criminal justice system. Indeed, without wholesale disposition of cases, 
the system would fall in on itself.
186
 Plea- and sentence-bargaining dominate modern criminal 
prosecution in the United States.
187
 However, as set forth at this Article’s outset, when the threat 
of a lengthy sentence pressures an accused individual to plead to trumped-up offenses or to agree 
to a sentence still disproportionate to his actual criminal conduct, the practice loses all value. 
Overfiling sets the stage for coercive plea-bargaining by allowing prosecutors to begin 
the bargaining process with their foot on the neck of the accused.
188
 Reverting back to the 
Ezequiel Salinas hypothetical, Ezequiel was charged with an underlying felony of assault with a 
deadly weapon.
189
 And since the STEP Act allows a gang enhancement to the assault charge, 
Ezequiel faces at minimum a two-year enhancement on any felony conviction. For serious 
felonies
190
 and violent felonies, someone like Ezequiel faces a sentencing enhancement of five 
years and ten years, respectively.
191
 
Ezequiel and his brother were both charged with assault with a deadly weapon with an 
attached gang enhancement. According to the statute, if Ezequiel proceeds to trial he could face 
four years or a $10,000 fine on the underlying felony.
192
 If convicted on the underlying felony, 
Ezequiel’s sentence could double—up to eight years—because of the gang enhancement.
193
 
Instead of receiving an offer of less than a year in jail or even summary probation for simply 
being involved in a fight, Ezequiel will likely receive an offer closer to three years in prison.
194
 
In this hypothetical scenario, the gang enhancement significantly changes his bargaining 
position and potential exposure. Instead of a maximum four-year sentence—which in all 
                                                                
185  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see also H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea 
Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 75 (2011). 
186  See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and 
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (“[Plea-bargaining] is not some adjunct to the criminal justice 
system; it is the criminal justice system.”). 
187  See, e.g., Missouri, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (“In today’s criminal justice system . . . the negotiation of a plea 
bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.”). 
188  See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 185, at 65 n.13 (“‘[V]ast prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage’ 
can impinge on a defendant’s free will to choose whether or not to plead guilty to the proposed charges.” (quoting Tracey 
L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 866 (1995))). 
189  See supra Introduction.  
190  For a list of serious felonies, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 2015). 
191  See id. § 186.22(b)(1)(B); id. § 186.22(b)(1)(C). 
192  Id. § 245(a)(1). 
193
 Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(A). 
194  See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 118 (stating that California Penal Code § 186.22(a) “creates a substantive 
offense and provides for the punishment of up to three years for anyone ‘actively participat[ing]’ in a criminal street gang 
as either a felony or misdemeanor” (alteration in the original)).  
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likelihood would not be meted out at sentencing—Ezequiel, because of the enhanced charges, 
must bargain from a far inferior position. Even if Ezequiel did not participate in the fight, the 
potential sentence of twelve years could well lead a reasonable person to take a plea deal of three 
years rather than run the risk of losing at trial and being sentenced to an additional ten years. A 
defense attorney might even suggest that Ezequiel take the plea deal rather than go to trial, noting 
that the prosecutor will most likely attempt to introduce evidence to prove up the gang 
enhancement.
195
 The harmful effect of the gang evidence, even if only tenuously supported, could 
well prejudice a jury into believing that Ezequiel was just another gangbanger like his brother.
196
 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the introduction of such gang evidence could be enough to 
result in a guilty verdict when its absence would otherwise lead to an acquittal. 
At trial, a prosecutor might have a difficult time proving that a man without any gang 
tattoos and no criminal record fits the build of a hardened criminal committing crimes to benefit 
the Salinas gang. But, as discussed above, the gang enhancement can significantly impact the 
bargaining position of an accused as early as filing. Although the prosecution must prove the gang 
enhancement at a preliminary hearing, the applicable standard is probable cause—not beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
197
 Because of the low standard at a preliminary hearing, the gang enhancement 
could well survive the preliminary hearing
198
 or the grand jury hearing.
199
 A prosecutor working 
the case may well realize that proving the gang enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt would be 
difficult, but would recognize the benefit of attaching the enhancement to gain leverage in the 
inevitable plea and sentence discussions.
200
 
The problem is that even if the prosecutor is unable to prove to the jury that Ezequiel 
                                                                
195  See id. at 140 (“Because gang enhancements can add such a significant amount of time to one’s 
sentence, defendants will often accept the certainty of the prosecutor’s plea bargain rather than gamble with not only 
conviction and sentencing for the underlying crime, but also the possibility of adding an additional five years, ten years, or 
life sentence to his term.”); id. at 138 (“Gang enhancements have caused a drastic change in the advice that an attorney 
gives a client because they impose significantly higher sentences and the mere allegation is so highly prejudicial.”). 
196  See infra Part IV.B (providing a detailed discussion of the prejudicial impact of gang testimony). 
197  To establish probable cause, the prosecution must make some showing regarding the existence of each 
element of the charged offense. Williams v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 987, 990 (Cal. 1969).  
198  See Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposal for Defensive Summary Judgment 
in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 676-77 (2011) (“The purpose of a preliminary hearing is for the trial court to 
determine whether probable cause exists to bind a defendant over for trial. . . . The court may base its finding of probable 
cause entirely on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay or unlawfully obtained evidence.” (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 
5.1(e) and FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3))). 
199  See John P. Martin, Department: Practice Tips: Representing Clients Before Federal Grand Juries, 20 
L.A. LAW. 16, 17 (1997) (stating that after hearing the evidence against the accused, the grand jury determines the 
probability that a crime has been committed, and upon the grand jury’s “belief that there is sufficient information to hold 
an accused to answer at trial” it will issue an indictment); see also, e.g., STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL 
PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 177 
(2007) (“[G]rand juries are rubber stamps. The notion that they protect defendants—any defendants—against prosecutorial 
abuse is a fraud.”).  
200  Yoshino, supra note 3, at 132-33, 137-38 (discussing various incentives a prosecutor might have for 
filing a gang enhancement, including increasing the pressure on the defendant to plead, judges’ concerns for judicial 
efficiency, using the defendant’s gang membership as evidence of his motive to commit the crime, political pressure, 
permitting the admission of gang evidence against a defendant, and getting federal money to combat gang violence that is 
granted to prosecutors who have a demonstrated gang problem). 
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committed assault with a deadly weapon “for the benefit of”
201
 his brother’s criminal street gang 
“with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 
members,”
202
 the jury is arguably more likely to convict Ezequiel of the underlying felony 
regardless of his actual involvement because of his association with his brother. Additionally, 
should the case go to trial, Ezequiel may even be tried at the same time as his brother, further 
associating him with a gang member.
203
 Knowing this, Ezequiel’s defense counsel may suggest 
that the best course of action is to take a plea deal rather than proceed to trial.
204
 A defendant in 
Ezequiel’s position will plead if “the value of the plea, less the costs associated with transacting 
the plea bargain and serving the offered sentence, is worth more to the defendant than what he or 
she might gain at trial.”
205
 
Using anti-gang legislation to overfile charges and enhancements to benefit prosecutors 
during plea and sentence negotiations constitutes raw abuse of prosecutorial powers, and can (and 
frequently does) result in pleas and sentencing grossly disproportionate to the conduct of the 
accused.
206
 
B. Prejudicial Impact of Gang Testimony at Trial 
The potentially prejudicial effect of gang testimony at trial is seen in Ezequiel’s journey 
through the criminal justice system. As mentioned above, a prosecutor can attach a gang 
allegation or enhancement, proceed past the preliminary hearing stage because of the low 
probable cause standard, and introduce evidence of a defendant’s affiliation—however loose—
with a particular gang. Even if the jury is not convinced of the involvement of gang activity, the 
introduction of gang evidence will almost certainly affect the jury’s view of the underlying felony 
count, should the case proceed to trial. 
In decades past, the word “gang” did not carry the sinister impact it now conveys. In 
People v. Zammora, a case from the 1940s, a California appellate court concluded that the use of 
                                                                
201  CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2015). 
202  Id. 
203  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) (“The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction . . . .”); see also United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362, 371 
(D. Colo. 1996) (ordering separate trials due to the “unacceptable risk” of violating the Confrontation Clause should 
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols be tried jointly). 
204  See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 139 (“The mere possibility of having a gang enhancement added at the 
preliminary hearing may cause [a public defender] to advise his client to take the prosecution’s offer because: (1) the 
addition of the gang enhancement increases the client’s sentencing exposure significantly; (2) the prejudicial nature of the 
gang enhancement will often lead to the client’s conviction based on his alleged gang membership without proper 
consideration of the facts; and (3) the client is left only with the defense that he was a minor gang member, or only an 
associate, which is hardly a reliable defense on which to stake one’s liberty.”). 
205  Caldwell, supra note 185, at 70. 
206  It is interesting to note that § 1192.7 of the California Penal Code prohibits plea-bargaining for any 
serious felony “unless[, among other reasons,] there is insufficient evidence to prove the people’s case.” CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1192.7(a)(2) (West 2015). However, under the notion that we are all innocent until proven guilty (beyond a 
reasonable doubt), plea-bargaining a serious felony charge when the prosecutor does not have enough evidence to prove 
guilt is essentially plea-bargaining an innocent individual, as he has not yet been proven guilty, and thus is presumed 
innocent.  
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the word “gang” carried no more weight than its literal meaning as a group of “the usual and 
ordinary crowd of young people living in any particular neighborhood, who associate themselves 
together, and from time immemorial has been referred to as a ‘gang.’”
207
 The world has clearly 
changed since the 1940s. 
Just shy of four decades after hearing People v. Zammora, the California Supreme Court 
reached a different conclusion about the meaning and impact of introducing gang evidence in 
People v. Cardenas.
208
 In Cardenas, the court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by 
permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of common gang membership, because proof of 
such affiliation had “limited probative value, [and] its admission created a substantial danger of 
undue prejudice.”
209
 Two years later, in Williams v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court 
stated that “evidence of common gang membership . . . is arguably of limited probative value 
while [also] creating a significant danger of unnecessary prejudice.”
210
 Additionally, the court 
stated that “[t]he implication that gangs were involved and the allegation that petitioner is a gang 
member might very well lead a jury to cumulate the evidence and conclude that petitioner must 
have participated in some way in the murders”
211
 Thus, although the court in Cardenas and 
Williams specifically addressed the admissibility of evidence of common gang membership, it 
takes no stretch of logic to conclude that the reason the court suppressed the evidence was the 
connotation of the word “gang,” and that even the mere use of the word could unduly prejudice a 
jury against the defendant.
212
 As a California appellate court, in People v. Perez,
213
 stated “[i]t is 
fair to say that when the word ‘gang’ is used in Los Angeles County, one does not have visions of 
the characters from the ‘Our Little Gang’ series. The word gang . . . connotes opprobrious 
implications.”
214
 Supporting this conclusion, a 2014 study of 212 participants in a simulated trial 
found that “the introduction of testimony indicating any sort of association with a gang, even a 
                                                                
207  People v. Zammora, 152 P.2d 180, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). In Zammora, the Delgadillo family was 
hosting a birthday party at their home, and had twenty or thirty invited guests in attendance. Id. at 184. After the party had 
begun winding down, a group of uninvited guests, known only as the “boys from Downey,” joined in an altercation with 
several of the younger Delgadillo guests down by a small pond located on the Delgadillo property. Id. As a result of the 
fight, one victim was killed and two victims were severely injured. Id. at 185. The indictment charged twenty-two 
defendants, each with murder and assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 184. The trial court found three of the defendants 
guilty of first-degree murder and nine of the defendants guilty of second-degree murder. Id. Upon review, the California 
appellate court remanded the case due to the lack of a fair trial received by the defendants. Id. at 216. One of the factors 
considered during review was the prejudicial impact of the repeated use of the word “gang.” Id. at 204-05. Although 
appellants contend that the frequented reference to their involvement in the “38th Street Gang” resulted in their prejudice, 
the appellate court did not agree because “the term was not used in such a manner as to convey any opprobrious or sinister 
implications.” Id. at 205. In coming to that resolve, the court reflected on the “ages of the members . . . coupled with the 
nature and character of their association.” Id.  
208  People v. Cardenas, 647 P.2d 569 (Cal. 1982). 
209  Id. at 572. 
210  Williams v. Superior Court, 683 P.2d 699, 705 (Cal. 1984). 
211  Id. at 706. 
212  See Rutkowski, supra note 6, at 148 (“Given the various statutory provisions, theories of prosecution, 
and psychological ‘gang’ factors, it is important to label correctly particular actors and acts as gang involved.”). 
213  People v. Perez, 170 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
214  Id. at 623. 
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weak one, can have a significant prejudicial effect on jury verdicts.”
215
 
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kennedy v. Lockyer,
216
 reversed a trial 
court and held that allowing “testimony regarding gang membership ‘creates a risk that the jury 
will [probably] equate gang membership with the charged crimes’”
217
 and that “the use of gang 
membership evidence to imply ‘guilt by association’ is impermissible and prejudicial.”
218
 As a 
result of the introduction of gang evidence’s prejudicial impact, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the matter.
219
 
V. STRIKING A BALANCE IN ANTI-GANG PROSECUTION 
Legislatures across the country have given prosecutors powerful tools to combat the 
scourge of gang violence.
220
 Such power wielded by overzealous prosecutors can wreak serious 
damage on a system striving to strike a balance between public safety and individual liberty.
221
 
                                                                
215  Eisen et al., supra note 184, at 8, 12. 
216  Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2004). In Kennedy, the defendant, Robert Kennedy, was 
tried twice for selling a substance in lieu of cocaine. Id. at 1042. During the first trial, the court granted defense counsel’s 
motion to “exclude all references to any gangs and any gang affiliation,” unless allowed by the court. Id. at 1044. In 
addition, the judge told the prosecutor that he would “have to be pretty convincing before [the judge would] let that 
[evidence] come in.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting transcript) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first 
trial judge’s reasoning behind prohibiting the gang references was that “the introduction of evidence tending to show gang 
affiliation on the part of Kennedy would be highly prejudicial.” Id. at 1055. After the first trial resulted in a hung jury, 
Kennedy twice requested a copy of the complete transcript from the state court, and was subsequently denied such a copy. 
Id. at 1042-43. During the second trial the prosecutor (who happened to be the same prosecutor as was present in the first 
trial) introduced gang-related evidence, and Kennedy’s newly acquired counsel, not being aware of the first trial judge’s 
motion to exclude gang-related evidence, failed to object. Id. at 1043. The jury found Kennedy guilty, and because he had 
“two prior serious or violent offenses, he was sentenced for the $20 sale of a non-drug to a prison term of twenty-five 
years to life.” Id. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the case law “make[s] it clear that evidence 
relating to gang involvement will almost always be prejudicial and will constitute reversible error. Evidence of gang 
membership may not be introduced . . . to prove intent or culpability.” Id. at 1055. 
217  Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d at 1056 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hankey, 203 
F.3d 1160, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
218  Id.  
219  Id. at 1057-58. California’s state courts have largely followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead in this respect. As 
recently as 2010, in People v. Memory, a California appellate court reversed defendant Memory’s conviction for voluntary 
manslaughter following a trial that saw extensive testimony regarding the nature of the Jus Brothers Motorcycle Gang, of 
which Memory was a member. People v. Memory, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353, 376-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). Noting that 
“[g]ang evidence should not be admitted at trial where its sole relevance is to show a defendant’s criminal disposition or 
bad character as a means of creating an inference the defendant committed the charged offense,” id. at 372 (quoting People 
v. Sanchez, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)), the appellate court concluded 
that allowing “expert” testimony connecting Jus Brothers with Hell’s Angels allowed “unreasonable inferences to be 
made by the trier of fact that the [defendant] was guilty of the offense on the theory of ‘guilt by association.’” Id. at 373 
(alteration in original) (quoting In re Wing Y., 136 Cal. Rptr. 390, 395-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
220  See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992) (“The power and 
prestige of the American prosecutor have changed dramatically over the past twenty years. . . . [P]rosecutors wield vastly 
more power than ever before.”). 
221  See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“[The prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite 
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With that balance in mind and without suggesting wholesale change, there are aspects of the 
criminal justice system that could be rethought to better achieve that sought-after balance. I offer 
three proposals. The first seeks independent review of prosecutorial misconduct. Second, there 
should be full and complete discovery from the time of initial filing continuing on an expedited 
basis throughout pre-trial and into trial. And third, in joining crimes arising from completely 
independent events where at least one of the alleged crimes involves gang involvement, the 
burden should shift from the defense to the prosecution to establish a lack of prejudicial impact 
due to the joinder. 
A. Establish a Statewide Prosecutorial Review Board 
“[W]hile [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones.”
222
 
In making recommendations to improve the ethical prosecution of gang-related cases, we 
must start with the simple admonition for prosecutors entrusted with these serious cases to follow 
the ethical guidelines to which they are sworn.
223
 Doing so would most likely obviate the need for 
further recommendations. The unfortunate reality, however, is that in the often combative and 
competitive world of criminal prosecution, there is so often the tendency to lose sight of the goals 
of the system—namely, that justice be done.
224
 And so, with a nod to reality, I propose a statewide 
prosecutorial review board to investigate and, when appropriate, sanction prosecutor misconduct. 
Prosecutors who abuse anti-gang legislation to obtain disproportionate pleas and 
sentences or to gain tactical advantage should be directly sanctioned.
225
 This is a bold proposition 
but realistic and necessary.
226
 Currently, the occurrence of any form of direct sanction against an 
errant prosecutor is so remote as to be freakish and, even then, only when circumstances are 
egregious and the resulting hardship is unfair.
227
 As discussed earlier, one such freakish event 
                                                                
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. . . . It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one.”). 
222  Id. 
223  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2008) (stating that prosecutors are “minister[s] of 
justice”); see also Zacharias, supra note 8 (claiming that, in criminal cases, the “codes” treat prosecutors as “ministers 
having an ethical duty to do justice”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
224  See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that a prosecutor’s “interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”). 
225  See Caldwell, supra note 182, at 89; see also Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A 
Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 303, 316 (2010) (“The disciplining of lawyers who commit misconduct . . . provides an appropriate vehicle for 
punishing prosecutors who violate Brady.”). 
226  See generally Caldwell, supra note 182. 
227  See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, CRIM. JUSTICE, 
Spring 2008, at 24, 37 (noting a study’s finding that in most cases of misconduct “prosecutors suffered no consequences 
and were not held accountable or even reprimanded for their behavior”); see also In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764 (Ariz. 2004) 
(disbarring prosecutor for using false testimony from a jailhouse informant to obtain convictions and death sentences for 
all three defendants in a triple-murder trial); Natasha Minsker, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 45 CAL. 
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occurred in 2013, when Texas judge Ken Anderson was sent to jail because of his actions while a 
prosecutor.
228
 In prosecuting defendant Michael Morton, Anderson intentionally withheld 
evidence; Morton was convicted, and subsequently served nearly twenty-five years in prison.
229
 
Texas dusted off an underutilized “court of inquiry,” a procedure typically used to hold elected 
officials accountable, and brought it to bear on Anderson.
230
 Unfortunately, this rare instance of 
calling out a prosecutor was only due to the significant publicity the case had generated.
231
 
Nonetheless, Texas officials used the procedure to examine and sanction the former prosecutor’s 
conduct.
232
 
With the exception of this aberrational circumstance in Texas, no state has a mechanism 
to effectively examine and sanction instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
233
 One commentator 
recently noted that “[n]o institution or entity has yet established a system to examine the large 
percentage of wrongful convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct and to attempt to make 
recommendations to deter such misconduct.”
234
 
Curiously, while there are judicial misconduct boards in virtually all states to examine 
allegations of judicial misconduct and mete out appropriate sanctions, no such mechanism exists 
in any state to examine prosecutorial misconduct and impose appropriate sanctions.
235
 
Other than internal controls within each prosecuting office, prosecutors are virtually free 
to go about their business with impunity.
236
 For the most part, the only time any instance of 
misconduct by a prosecutor comes to light is in appellate decisions. It is not unusual for appellate 
courts to cite to instances of misconduct but uphold the conviction because the prosecutor’s 
                                                                
W. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (2009) (noting that, of six named prosecutors in California death penalty cases reversed for 
prosecutorial misconduct, “[f]ive have ‘no public record of discipline,’ and one is a sitting judge”). 
228  Supra notes 176 & 178. 
229  See Scott Ehlers, State Criminal Justice Network Legislative Update: Lessons Learned from Legislative 
Victories in the Lone Star State, CHAMPION, May 2014, at 47, 47 (2014) (“Exoneree [Michael Morton] . . . spent nearly a 
quarter-century in prison until DNA evidence proved that he was innocent.”). 
230  See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.01 (West 2015). 
231  See Ehlers, supra note 229, at 48 (“The national Innocence Project requested the court of inquiry. 
NACDL [National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers] Past Presidents Barry Scheck, Cynthia Orr, and Gerald 
Goldstein played a critically important role in the court of inquiry that resulted in criminal charges being filed against 
Anderson and his ultimate conviction for contempt of court.”) (footnotes omitted). 
232  See generally In re Honorable Ken Anderson, No. 12-0420-K26 (26th Dist. Ct., Williamson Cnty., Tex. 
Apr. 19, 2013), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/andersonfindings.pdf/view.  
233  See Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 
25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 919 (2012) (“When [prosecutorial] misconduct is uncovered, few jurisdictions provide 
adequate and consistent means of addressing it.”).  
234  Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U.D.C. 
L. REV. 275, 285 (2004). 
235  See Yaroshefsky, supra note 233, at 919 (“[P]rosecutors often escape censure for repeated disclosure 
violations, even in their own workplaces.”). 
236  See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-96 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from 
liability for false statements in a probable cause hearing); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) 
(holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for using false testimony at trial).  
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misconduct was deemed “harmless error.”
237
 And, even in such instances, the prosecutor’s 
misconduct results in no adverse consequences to the prosecutor.
238
 
Given such a lack of actual sanction and the protection of “harmless error” doctrine, 
gang prosecutors are free to abuse anti-gang legislation. A meaningful step in preventing abuses 
of anti-gang legislation would be to directly sanction abusive prosecutors. 
B. Full Discovery from Time of Initial Filing and Throughout Pretrial and Trial 
The criminal justice system is at its fairest and most effective when both the prosecution 
and defense have full knowledge of the facts and probable evidence in the charged offense.
239
 
Brady v. Maryland offered this promise, but, through various judicial permutations, has fallen 
short of that promise.
240
 Full disclosure from the filing of charges would render the inevitable plea 
negotiation a more evenhanded affair. Defense counsel would be in a better position to fairly 
evaluate the case and, should the case be over-charged, call out the prosecutor. Brady established 
the precedent for prosecutorial conduct regarding the suppression of evidence by declaring, “the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
241
 Brady was extended by United States v. Agurs, in which 
the Supreme Court required federal prosecutors to voluntarily provide exculpatory material to the 
defense, regardless of whether the defense specifically requests the information or not.
242
 The 
Court has held that evidence is material only if a reasonable probability exists that, “had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
243
 
The question of materiality is often speculative and, unfortunately, the decision whether to release 
information is typically left in the hands of the prosecutor.
244
 
Brady does not go far enough, and several states have been bold enough to implement 
policies designed to facilitate fuller discovery. Ohio, for example, recently revamped its criminal 
discovery rules at the urging of the Ohio Innocence Project.
245
 Ohio’s new rules now require 
                                                                
237  See, e.g., Hooks v. Oklahoma, 19 P.3d 294, 314 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), postconviction relief denied, 
22 P.3d 231 (Okla. Crim. App.), aff’d in part sub nom. Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 2010); Duckett v. 
Oklahoma, 919 P.2d 7, 19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2002). 
238  See cases cited supra note 237. 
239  See Caldwell, supra note 182, at 54 (“The American criminal justice system is at its fairest when both 
sides adhere to the rules.”).  
240  See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011) (concluding that the Supreme Court does not 
“assume that prosecutors will always make correct Brady decisions”); id. at 1367 (“Brady mistakes are inevitable.”) (J. 
Scalia, concurring); see also Gregory, supra note 4, at 830 (“[T]he lack of meaningful enforcement of the Brady rule by 
the courts, coupled with the near total absence of corresponding repercussions for prosecutors who violate Brady, renders 
the rule itself moot.”). 
241  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
242  See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976). 
243  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  
244  See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (“In the typical case . . . it is the State that decides 
which information must be disclosed.”). 
245  Gregory, supra note 4, at 847-48. 
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“disclosure of a large amount of material beyond that which is ‘favorable to the defendant and 
material to guilt or punishment.’”
246
 In addition, Ohio’s reform requires that “double-blind”
247
 
procedures take place when asking eyewitnesses to identify suspects.
248
 Minnesota and North 
Carolina have implemented an “open-file discovery” rule.
249
 Under open-file discovery, the 
prosecution is required to disclose all non-privileged evidence and information related to the case, 
whether in actual or constructive possession of the prosecution team, to the defense and to the 
court.
250
 The disclosure must occur in a timely manner,
251
 continue throughout the course of the 
trial,
252
 and full disclosure must be made
253
 prior to the defendant entering a guilty plea.
254
 The 
benefit of an open-file discovery rule is twofold. First, it allows the defendant to be fully aware of 
the State’s case against him. Common law jurisprudence holds each defendant innocent until 
proven guilty,
255
 thus giving the “innocent” defendant every opportunity to defend his innocence 
by being fully aware of the state’s case against him. Second, it removes the burden, and therefore 
the responsibility, of the prosecutor to make decisions regarding what evidence or information 
must be disclosed to the defense.
256
 While the open-file discovery rule may not be an all-
                                                                
246  Id. (quoting OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(B)(5)). 
247  See Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
807, 862 (2007) (defining double blind procedures as those in which “the experimenter does not know which participants 
are in the experimental and control groups”). 
248  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2015).  
249  Gurwitch, supra note 225, at 315 n.52. “Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New Hampshire and 
Oregon, require open file discovery in capital cases.” Id. 
250  Id. at 315.  
251  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3- 
3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) (“A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest 
feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.”); see also ABA MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2008) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . . make timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense . . . .”). 
252  See United States v. Manthei, 979 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that Brady is not violated when 
the Brady material is made available to the defendants before start of the trial); see also Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, 
Constitutional Duty of Federal Prosecutor to Disclose Brady Evidence Favorable to Accused, 158 A.L.R. FED. 401, § 2a 
(1999) (“[A] Brady violation can occur if the prosecution delays in transmitting evidence during trial . . . .”) (citing United 
States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
253  See Binimow, supra note 252, § 2a (“[A]s long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the 
defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence, due process is satisfied.”) (citing United States v. Allain, 671 F.2d 
248 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
254 See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecutor’s suppression of 
material evidence favorable to an accused violates due process). 
255  See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (“This Court has declared that one accused of a crime 
is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on 
grounds of an official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.”). 
256  Although I suggest broad open-file discovery practices in order to help curb Brady violations, I still 
acknowledge and agree that disclosure should not be made if such disclosure “could result in substantial harm to an 
individual or to the public interest.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 3 (2008). 
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encompassing solution to curbing some aspects of prosecutorial misconduct, it is a promising 
start. Full disclosure from the earliest aspects of a case would assist with the problem of coercive 
plea-bargaining. For instance, should a prosecutor attach a gang enhancement on less-than-
compelling evidence, full discovery would allow defense counsel to more fairly and accurately 
assess the evidence against her client and respond accordingly. 
In summary, if our hypothetical Ezequiel decides to defend his innocence and fight the 
charges, needless to say he will be in for an uphill battle. California does not practice “open-file 
discovery,” and prosecutorial misconduct can be as easy as sweeping exculpatory evidence under 
the rug. In order for Ezequiel to have a fighting chance and be given a fair trial, he has to hope 
that his prosecuting attorney favors justice over winning. Justice Souter said it best that 
“disclosure [of a favorable piece of evidence to the defense] will serve to justify trust in the 
prosecutor as ‘the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’”
257
 
C. Shift the Burden to the State to Establish Lack of Undue Prejudice  
When Joining Gang-Related Charges to Other Charges 
Consider the following addendum to the Ezequiel hypothetical: Two years prior to the 
Salinas-Hernandez fight, nineteen-year-old Ezequiel raped a seventeen-year-old. Although he was 
not immediately apprehended, DNA evidence was gathered in the rape case. However, there was 
no DNA evidence to match against that found at the scene, and consequently the rape case was 
left unresolved. Following Ezequiel’s alleged participation in the Salinas-Hernandez fight, 
Ezequiel’s DNA was taken and entered into the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”)
258
 and 
he was linked to the rape. 
The prosecutor then filed both crimes in one charging document with every intention of 
trying the two completely unrelated cases in one trial before one jury. A clever prosecutor would 
lead with the very strong DNA evidence in the rape case and follow with the more tentative 
evidence in the assault case. The concern, of course, is that the evidence in the rape case will 
surely prejudice the jurors against Ezequiel, which would most likely result in his conviction on 
the assault charge. Although studies have shown that a defendant’s chances of conviction 
increases by more than ten percent if he stands trial on more than one count,
259
 there remains a 
strong legislative preference for joinder.
260
 The rationale: “Trials are expensive, time consuming, 
and burdensome on witnesses and victims.”
261
 This legislative preference for joinder is also based 
in part on the belief that joinder helps “avoid needless harassment of defendants and . . . 
                                                                
257  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (omissions in original) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  
258  Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 760 (2011) 
(“Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) [is] a central database into which participating states and agencies can ‘load’ 
the genetic profiles they lawfully acquire and search among the profiles made available by other jurisdictions.”).  
259  Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and Severance on Federal Criminal 
Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 VAND. L. REV. 347, 401 (2006). 
260  See United States v. Pierce, 733 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Joinder is favored for reasons of 
judicial economy.”); United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Joinder remains the rule rather than the 
exception in criminal cases.”).  
261  Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 354. 
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prevent[s] piecemeal enforcement of the law, thus saving the public the time and expense of 
redundant trials.”
262
 
While addressing the topic of joinder, the Second Circuit in United States v. Smith stated, 
“Congress has authorized consolidation . . . [i.e. joinder] in the belief that public considerations of 
economy and speed outweigh possible unfairness to the accused.”
263
 There is, however, a fine line 
between the benefits of joinder to society and the burden imposed on the defendant. As voiced by 
the California Supreme Court, “the pursuit of judicial economy and efficiency may never be used 
to deny a defendant his right to a fair trial.”
264
 
The rub in every joinder scenario is that the more charges filed, the greater the prejudice 
to the accused.
265
 It benefits the prosecutor to have more than one charge against an accused.
266
 
One may recall the old adage, “Where there is smoke . . . .” Recognizing the goal of justice in 
criminal cases, is it fair to stack the deck when there is a real concern of prejudice because of 
joinder? Curiously, once a prosecutor makes the decision to file cases jointly it then remains for 
the accused to carry the burden that prejudice will result from joinder.
267
 Given the concerns of 
prejudice, should the burden be on the accused to establish prejudice as a result of joinder or on 
the prosecution to establish a lack of prejudice? 
Joinder is considered to be proper and thus presumably non-prejudicial in one of three 
settings: “First, joinder is allowed if the alleged crimes are based on the ‘same act or 
transaction.’”
268
 For example, the charges against a defendant who assaults a store clerk while 
robbing a grocery store can be joined. “Second, joinder is permitted if the alleged crimes are part 
of a ‘common scheme or plan,’ such as when a middleman buys drugs from a supplier then sells 
them to a distributor.”
269
 And third, “charges can be joined if they are of the ‘same or similar 
character.’”
270
 A defendant who robs a gas station in December and then again in July may have 
the two charges joined, “even if the two charges are distant in time and location and even if they 
are not part of an overarching criminal plan.”
271
 
In determining the prejudicial impact of joinder, most courts conclude that non-cross-
admissible charges
272
 should be severed if the inflammatory nature of one of the offenses, or of a 
                                                                
262
 MICHAEL G. MILLMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 52.01 (2014) (citing Kellett 
v. Superior Court, 409 P.2d 206, 209 (Cal. 1966)).  
263  Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 112 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1940)). 
264  Williams v. Superior Court, 683 P.2d 699, 706 (Cal. 1984). 
265  Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 355 (“[T]he more counts in the indictment, the quicker the jury 
may be to assume that the accused must be guilty of something.”). 
266  See id. at 369 (“Joining additional charges increases the conviction rate . . . .”). 
267  See 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 223, at 489 (4th ed. 
West 2015) (“The burden is on the defendant to make a strong showing of prejudice to obtain the relief permitted by Rule 
14.”). 
268  Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 353. 
269  Id. 
270  Id. 
271  Id. 
272  To determine cross-admissibility of the evidence of each joined charge, one must determine whether 
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distinctive common factor, could have a prejudicial effect on the jury in a joint trial,
273
 or if 
joinder of a strong case with a weak one, or of two weak cases, would create a likelihood that the 
jury would impermissibly aggregate the evidence.
274
 However, because of the policy favoring 
joinder, the burden falls to the defense to establish undue prejudice due to joinder.
275
 Given the 
significant prejudicial concern involving gang-related charges the burden should shift to the state 
to establish a lack of undue prejudice due to joinder of a gang-related case to any other charge. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Efforts to protect those caught up in the criminal justice system are unpopular. The level 
of crime and devastation generated by gang culture in the United States makes this especially true 
for efforts to curb the growing influence of anti-gang legislation and the agents who enforce such 
legislation, public prosecutors. Yet, it is not criminals who would be protected by the changes 
suggested in this Article. It is not Jesse Salinas, a known member of a violent street gang, who 
would benefit. Rather, it would be people like Ezequiel, whose only “crime” was being related to 
his brother. 
Implementation of the proposals set forth would strike a balance in gang prosecutions 
such that only those gang participants meriting the harsh consequences of the legislation would 
feel the appropriate wrath of the law. 
 
                                                                
“evidence on each of the joined charges would have been admissible . . . in separate trials on the others.” People v. Kraft, 5 
P.3d 68, 99 (Cal. 2000). In addition, if the trial court finds the evidence is in fact cross-admissible, then “[s]uch cross-
admissibility would ordinarily dispel any inference of prejudice.” Jacki Brown Evans, Issues of Severance, Cross-
Admissibility and Sua Sponte Instructions in Sexual Offense Cases, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 112 (1991) (quoting People 
v. Miller, 790 P.2d 1289, 1306 (1990)); see also United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 370 (3d Cir. 2001). 
273  The concern with a disparity of evidence between two charges is that the jury could logically conclude 
that because “[the defendant] did it before, he must have done it again.” United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th 
Cir. 1985). On the other hand, the concern with inflaming the jury is that the jury might become so emotionally outraged 
due to the defendant’s evidenced guilt for one crime, that they would punish him with a guilty charge for another crime as 
well.  
274  When a “weak” case is joined with a “strong” case or with another “weak” case, the spillover effect of 
aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges, in essence making two 
plus two equal five. As mentioned earlier, the concern is that the jury might logically, as opposed to emotionally, conclude 
that because “[the defendant] did it before, he must have done it again.” Id. 
275  See People v. Johnson 764 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Cal. 1988) (“[D]efendant can predicate [joinder] error only 
on a clear showing of potential prejudice.”).  
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